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This article addresses the impact of productivity, corruption, and trade openness on the stock returns of 265 industrial companies listed in 
eight Eastern European fast-emerging markets, over the 2004– 2013 period. Through a three-factor model that includes both measures at 
firm level and macro-level control variables, our findings suggest that country corruption index is negatively correlated with the total annual 
return of the stocks of the listed industrial companies of our sample. Moreover, the most productive firms are featured by higher stock 
returns, while leverage seems not to be a key predictor of stock returns. In addition, the article uncovers innovative evidence about trade 
openness that is nega- tively correlated with stock returns due to its connection with the recent financial crisis. That is, firms operating in 
markets that are more open to trade show a higher degree of interconnection with other economies and are more likely to undergo the 
effects of negative fluctuations from foreign markets during the economic crisis. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
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Introduction and Literature Review 
lthough corporate finance has historically 
researched about the determinants of stock 
returns and modeling future yields (e.g., forecast- 
ing cost of capital and capital budgeting issues), recently 
corporate governance has focused its attention on mea- 
suring the impact of different control variables (e.g., 
governance indexes, corruption, productivity, and trade 
openness) on listed companies’ stock returns. This field 
of study has become more relevant over time because of 
an increasing significance of control variables viewed as 
powerful devices for attracting foreign direct investment 
and fostering economic development. 
Moreover, in the past several years the financial 
turmoil, which has violently shaken many European 
economies, has contributed to a more precisely focused 
analysis of second-best variables (Arnone, Bellavite Pel- 
legrini, & Graziadei, 2006; Qerimi & Sergi, 2012, 2015) 
in different geographical and economic environments. 
Unlike other studies (Bellavite Pellegrini, 2008; Bellavite 
Pellegrini, Romelli, & Sironi, 2011), our study takes into 
consideration 265 listed industrial companies belonging 
to eight Eastern European fast-emerging markets, over 
the years 2004–2013. By focusing our attention on East- 
ern European countries, which are usually part of a less 
intensive stream of research and which represent a pos- 
sible center of gravity of financial markets in the next year 
(Kandogan, 2014), we provide additional institutional 
and empirical evidence to the international debates. 
Therefore, our research mainly analyzes the impact and 
the influence of an extensive set of governance variables 
that might affect stock returns of listed industrial compa- 
nies, which are located in the evolving institutional and 
economic markets of Eastern Europe. Finally, we provide 
some policy suggestions. 
 
Furthermore, this period encompasses the last years 
of the economic euphoria (2003–2006) and the mul- 
tifaceted aspects of the economic and financial crisis 
(2007–2013), providing partially different evidence in 
comparison with precrisis times. In order to implement 
our analysis, we adopt a Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1995) three-factor model for forecasting stock perfor- 
mances, adding further control variables in terms of 
productivity at firm level (Parhizgari & Aburachis, 2003) 
and of corruption (Arnone & Borlini, 2014) and trade 
openness at country level. 
This article provides interesting proof about the 
impact of the above-mentioned variables on stock returns 
in the context of cross-country analysis. In details, the 
results show that, while investors require lower returns 
in countries that show unimportant level of corruption, 
trade openness is likely to play a different role, according 
to business and economic cycles. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: 
The next section is devoted to the data description, 
followed by a third section on estimation and methodol- 
ogy. The fourth section implements an empirical analysis 
in order to understand the impact of the above-mentioned 
control variables on stock returns. Finally, some concluding 
remarks provide suggestions for future research agenda. 
 
Data 
We considered in our analysis 265 industrial companies1 
listed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia over 
the period from January 1, 2004, to the end of Decem- 
ber 2013. We dropped the companies belonging to the 
financial sector from our sample mainly because of the 
limited comparability with industrial companies’ indices. 
In Tables 1 and 2, we provide some evidence about gross 
 
TABLE 1 Relative Weight of the National Gross Domestic Product (%) 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Value 
Czech Republic 19.72 19.58 19.96 19.38 19.90 20.71 20.1 20.05 19.46 18.71 19.74 
Estonia 2.00 2.02 2.18 2.28 2.04 1.97 1.89 2.01 2.13 2.23 2.06 
Latvia 2.42 2.46 2.78 3.18 3.02 2.63 2.32 2.48 2.69 2.77 2.64 
Lithuania 3.75 3.76 3.88 4.08 4.04 3.76 3.60 3.83 4.03 4.16 3.90 
Hungary 17.10 16.11 14.67 14.22 13.24 13.04 12.57 12.3 11.93 11.96 13.99 
Poland 42.15 43.81 44.11 44.05 44.95 43.93 46.24 46.21 46.68 47.11 44.73 
Slovenia 5.71 5.22 5.09 4.94 4.69 5.05 4.65 4.52 4.35 4.30 4.94 
Slovakia 7.15 7.04 7.33 7.87 8.12 8.91 8.63 8.60 8.73 8.76 7.99 





TABLE 2 Relative Weight of the Market Capitalization of Each National Stock Exchange (%) 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average Value 
Estonia 1.07 1.08 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.93 
Lithuania 1.21 1.16 1.02 0.94 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.98 
Latvia 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.70 
Poland 63.34 62.65 60.37 60.43 59.69 58.96 58.29 57.67 57.13 56.77 59.9 
Hungary 16.74 16.55 15.94 15.95 15.75 15.55 15.37 15.2 15.05 14.95 15.81 
Slovenia 4.75 4.69 4.54 4.55 4.49 4.45 4.39 4.34 4.30 4.28 4.50 
Czech Republic 10.99 12.03 15.45 15.46 16.56 17.65 18.66 19.63 20.49 21.07 16.23 
Slovak 1.10 1.06 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.96 
Note: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
 
Country Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Slovenia Total 
Total number of listed industrial companies 10 14 20 175 19 5 3 19 265 
Percentage of the sample 3.77 5.28 7.54 66.03 7.16 1.88 1.13 7.16 100 
Note: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
domestic product (GDP) and market capitalization of 
the different countries belonging to the sample, and in 
Table 3 we present some descriptive statistics about the 
geographical distribution of the companies composing 
the sample. 
The weight of Poland, Czech Republic, and Hun- 
gary represents on average values of 78.46% of the GDP 
of the sample. However, the relative weight of Poland 
increases by 11.77%, the Czech Republic is substantially 
stable, and Hungary experiences a significant decrease 
of 30.05%. Moreover, we notice that even if in absolute 
terms the weight of Slovakia is marginal, in relative terms 
the country registers an increase of 22.51% while in the 
case of Slovenia it is the other way around, with a decrease 
of 24.69%. [The relative increase of GDP share is com- 
puted with the formula 100*[GDP(2013)-GDP(2004)]/ 
GDP(2004)] 
Table 2 provides some further information about 
the relevance of the previously mentioned countries 
in terms of market capitalization. In average val- 
ues, the relative weight of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic sums up to 91.94%, attributing to all 
the other countries of the sample a quite marginal 
relative weight. However, the relative weights of Poland 
and Hungary, respectively, decreased by 10.37% and 
10.69%. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic doubled the 
relative weight of the market capitalization over the 
years 2004–2013. 
Finally, Table 3 provides some information about the 
geographical distribution of the population of the listed 
industrial companies composing the sample. This distribu- 
tion only partially reflects the above-mentioned evidence 
about GDP and market capitalization. Indeed, Polish com- 
panies represent 66.03%; meanwhile, Lithuania, Hungary, 
and Slovenia, which register very similar weights, represent 
altogether 21.86% of the sample. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
The aim of the article is the identification of the determi- 
nants of the stock returns of the sample of 265 industrial 
companies listed in time interval 2004–2013. The model 




= α + β x’
it 
+ εit 
where i represents the i-th company in the sample in the 
year of observation t. The dependent variable y
it 
indicates 
the annual investment return of the stock for the i-th 
company in year t, and the regressors are included in 
the vector of observations x’
it
; α is the intercept, while 
the vector of β coefficients measures the impact of each 
regressor on the expected value of the dependent vari- 
able and is obtained by the method of ordinary least 
squares. Concerning the error term (εit) distribution, we 





ing the clustering of observations corresponding to a 
specific company. Consequently, we assume that the error 
term is independent and identically distributed across 
firms, taking into account the nonindependence of 
within-firm observations. All reported standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). This 
procedure enhances the robustness of our findings and 
allows us to take the panel data structure of our sample 
into account. In addition, this specification of the model 
allows us to control the effects of country fixed effects 
that are dropped in a fixed-effects model due to the col- 
linearity with fixed effects at firm level. The estimates of 
the coefficients of the dummy years and of the control 
variables are consistent in the sign and in the significance 
with the estimates obtained running a fixed-effects model 
that we have implemented as robustness checks. 
The variables considered as regressors are the market 
capitalization, the trade openness, single-country market 
risk premium, a corporate productivity index, and the 
index of control of corruption. In addition, we control 
for the effect of two additional firm-specific variables: the 
corporate gearing and the volatility of stock prices. These 
last indices appear to be suitable proxies to identify the 
financial risk of the different companies and are useful 
to check the robustness of the effects of corporate pro- 
ductivity and control of corruption. Finally, we introduce 
country and year dummies. 
In the model, the stock investment return of each 
company (the dependent variable) is the financial per- 
formance of a listed company, calculated as the variation 
in share prices. 
In our analysis, we consider the following indepen- 
dent variables: (1) control of corruption index, (2) gear- 
ing, (3) market capitalization, (4) market risk premium, 
(5) price volatility, (6) corporate productivity index, and 
(7) trade openness. The control of corruption is represented 
by a specific index elaborated by the World Bank. It cap- 
tures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by  
elites and private interests. It has been calculated for each 
country every year. The gearing has been computed as the 
ratio of the total debt over its equity and is a measure of 
a company’s financial leverage. 
The link between leverage indices and stock returns 
is underlined in the literature (Penman, Richardson, & 
Tuna, 2007) as a potential predictor of stock returns. Mar- 
ket capitalization represents the market value (in euros) 
of the companies’ overall outstanding shares, and it is 
calculated multiplying the number of outstanding shares 
of a company by the market price of one share at the 
end of each year. In our specification, as it is common in 
corporate governance literature, we include the natural 
logarithm of this variable in order to improve the fit of 
the model. Market risk premium is another well-known and 
suitable indicator for the prediction of investment returns 
(Fama & French, 1992, 1993). It is the difference between 
the return on a market portfolio and on a risk-free asset. 
With respect to the period 2004–2013, the market risk 
premium has been calculated as the difference between a 
single-country stock exchange index and a single-country 
central bank discount interest rate. The price volatility 
represents the measure of a stock’s average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each 
year and is a key variable in explaining firms’ stock return 
in literature (Duffee, 1995). The expected value of the 
volatility coefficients is negative, because higher variabil- 
ity of price per share of a stock company implies a higher 
risk premium in stock returns. The ratio between sales 
and total assets represents a suitable proxy of a corporate 
productivity index, indicating the ability of the companies 
to generate revenues according to the total assets.2 Fol- 
lowing Dellas and Hess (2005), we finally introduced 
a trade openness indicator as a control variable in deter- 
mining the stock returns. Trade openness is the sum of 
a country’s exports and imports divided by GDP and is 
obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT), which is the 
most widely used source for cross-country comparisons 
for the level and growth rate of macroeconomic variables. 
In the empirical model, country and year dummies 
(not displayed in the table results) are introduced for 
protecting estimates to the effect of omitted variables and 
to exogenous shocks, especially because of the financial 
turmoil since 2007. The decision to adopt a parsimonious 
model for the regression analysis is necessary to protect 
estimates by the bias due to the collinearity that is com- 
mon when several corporate variables are introduced. 
Indeed, many accounting indices are implemented using 
deeply interconnected variables, such as total assets, total 
debts, and revenues. The choice to introduce only two 
variables that deal with a company’s balance sheet (gear- 
ing and productivity, which are uncorrelated) produces 
more reliable and robust estimates. 
Descriptive statistics related to the main explanatory 
variables are illustrated in Table 4. 
 
Empirical  Resul ts  
Table 5 provides a specification in order to measure 
whether the previously discussed explanatory variables 
are statistically significant, with positive or negative effect, 





TABLE 4 Descriptive Statistics for the Explanatory 
Variables 
 
Explanatory Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Control of corruption 2,915 0.397 0.236 
Sales/Total assets 2,305 1.158 1.554 
Log (market capitalization) 







Price volatility 2,915 0.489 0.259 
Trade openness 2,915 16.217 6.732 
Country risk premium 2,915 10.708 33.144 
Gearing (%) 2,224 58.817 92.769 
Note: Author’s elaborations using Stata. 
 
TABLE 5 Determinants of Stock Returns for the Whole 
Sample (2004–2013) 
 
Variables Coefficient T stat 
Control of corruption –0.465*** –2.751 
Sales/Total assets 0.127*** 2.883 
Log (market capitalization) 0.115*** 2.684 
Price volatility 1.376*** 2.766 
Trade openness –0.031* –1.721 
Country risk premium 0.014*** 5.721 
Gearing –0.001 –0.968 
Country fixed effects   
Estonia 0  
Latvia –0.461 –1.595 
Lithuania –0.866** –2.411 
Poland –0.897* –1.917 
Czech Republic –1.203** –2.529 
Slovakia –1.144** –2.235 
Slovenia –0.439 –1.544 
Hungary –0.620** –2.325 
Intercept –0.364 –0.512 
Observations 2002  
*0.1 < p < 0.05; **0.05 < p < 0.01; ***p < 0.01. 
Note: Year dummies are included but omitted from the outputs. 
 
 
Almost all of the previously considered independent 
variables show an impact on the total investment return 
and their coefficients are statistically significant. There 
may be two reasons for the limited variance explained by 
the regression sum of squares (about 6%). The first can 
be found in the nature of the analyzed regressors, which 
 
are different from the usual ones considered by the litera- 
ture following the Fama and French models and which 
have shown good performance in the ability to explain 
the variance. The second reason, instead, is related to the 
decision to implement an analysis of the whole sample 
as a single portfolio,3 without splitting the sample into 
groups of more homogeneous companies. Past studies 
(e.g., Bellavite Pellegrini et al., 2011) show that R2 may 
greatly increase, splitting the sample in portfolios ranked 
by capitalization. 
The coefficients of control of corruption and gearing 
present a negative effect on the stock return, even if only 
the first one seems to be statistically significant. Coun- 
tries characterized by a lower level of corruption and, in 
broader terms, by a higher governance index are likely 
to be considered more reliable by investors. Presum- 
ably, these markets are more stable and less volatile, and 
investors are able to require a lower return because their 
investments are supposed to be less risky in the long run. 
These findings have implications for the stock perfor- 
mances of Eastern European listed companies between 
2004 and 2013 and substantiate the importance of an 
anticorruption stance at an international level; indeed, 
this last aspect has been recently promoted by national 
and international economic and financial authorities. 
Moreover, the negative impact of corruption creates a 
suspicious institutional environment that is less propi- 
tious or less suitable to economic and business activity. 
The variable control of corruption, which represents a 
risk measure at the macroeconomic level, detects a more 
relevant impact than a corporate variable like leverage. If 
leverage seems not to be a key predictor of stock returns 
at the firm level, the price volatility performs better 
instead. According to the risk-return theory, more vola- 
tile investments have to compensate the additional risk 
with a larger return; this evidence is true only in the long 
run: if the analyzed period is short enough to consider a 
recessive period, less risky assets will offer higher returns, 
compared to more risky assets. 
The coefficients of market capitalization and market 
risk premium are statistically significant and positively 
correlated with stocks’ returns. Furthermore, the ratio 
between revenues and the total assets, taken as a proxy of  
productivity, shows a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, although its size is small. These results are 
coherent with Bellavite Pellegrini (2008) and Bellavite 
Pellegrini et al. (2011), which utilize, respectively, the 
ratio between revenues and working capital and between 
sales and the number of employees as productivity index.  
Considering that improving and monitoring productivity 





these may be also considered as a way to predict and to 
foster industrial stock returns. 
Another interesting result concerns the negative 
impact of trade openness index on stock returns; the 
higher is the incidence of imports and exports on 
GDP, the lower are the average stock returns of the 
corporations listed in that country. This inverse rela- 
tionship is only apparently counterintuitive and may 
be explained as follows: countries with higher levels 
of trade openness show also higher degrees of trade 
interconnection with foreign countries and are poten- 
tially more sensible to the economic cycles of the con- 
nected economies. While countries may benefit from 
the respective business relationship when the economic 
situation is favorable (Yellen, 2013), such interconnec- 
tion may be a device for propagating risks and losses 
during financial crises. As our sample covers mostly the 
years of the different disguises of the Great Financial 
Depression (2007–2013), probably the negative sign 
of trade openness incorporates the depressive effect 
of the economic and financial crisis affecting mainly 
the strict interconnection between our sample and the 
Western economies. This outcome casts a shadow over 
the supposed virtue of trade openness; in particular, its 
effects on industrial companies’ stock returns should be 
properly declined according to the different phases of 
economic cycle. 
Interesting findings finally concern the analysis of the 
sign of country dummies: these coefficients indicate the 
average difference of average stock returns with respect 
to the reference category (Estonia in our model), net 
of the effect of all the other variables. Considering that 
all the signs are negative, Estonia shows higher stock 
returns than any other countries of our sample, followed 
by Latvia and Slovenia, whose performances are in line 
with that of Estonia; these findings confirm the already 
known evidence in Western and Central Europe about 
the outstanding economic and financial performances 
of small-sized countries in terms of high stock returns 
(Bellavite Pellegrini, 2008). In particular, the results of 
Baltic Republics are coherent with the recent literature: 
Aliouche (2015) analyzed 125 economies between 2007 
and 2011 in terms of a country’s investment attractive- 
ness; results suggest that Estonia and Latvia, and to a 
lesser extent Lithuania, experienced specific drops in 
rankings based on economic/political and legal/regula- 
tory reliability. That increase in markets risks probably 
was not totally captured by the corruption index included 
in our model. Hence, higher performances in these 
countries’ financial markets may be justified by the need 
to pay a specific risk premium. Indeed, country dummies’ 
effects may infer the impact of variables summarizing all 
sources of residual unobserved heterogeneity in terms of 
overall risks at the country level. 
On the contrary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
detect the lowest levels of stock returns. This last outcome 
does not surprise, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
which were connected with the once-upon-a-time Czecho- 
slovakia for historical reason, first experienced the devel- 
opment of their financial markets. In the sampled period, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia decreased the intensity 
of the rate of growth of their firms’ stock returns. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
A Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995) three-factor 
model approach augmented with additional control vari- 
ables at both the macroeconomic4 and corporate levels 
was employed to address the stock returns of a sample 
of listed industrial companies of Eastern European fast- 
emerging markets for the period January 1, 2004, to 
December 31, 2013. Although as “second-best outcomes” 
(Arnone et al., 2006), our results confirm the importance 
of different typologies of control variables in determining 
the stock returns of our sample of listed industrial compa- 
nies. Our results partially confirm the existing literature, 
adding however some innovative evidence related to the 
peculiarity of the sample: market capitalization, price 
volatility, country risk premium, and corporate productiv- 
ity affect positively with statistically significant coefficients 
(although of different magnitudes) the stock return of 
the sample, while control of corruption, and trade open- 
ness are inversely related with statistically significant coef- 
ficients. 
A lower level of corruption is highly appreciated by 
investors, who require a lower return for their invest- 
ments, increasing consequently the current value of their 
assets. In contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Bellavite 
Pellegrini et al., 2011), we find innovative evidence about 
an inverse relationship between trade openness and total 
investment return due to the different impact of an inter- 
connection index in economic euphoric and otherwise 
depressed years. Furthermore gearing is not likely to play 
any role in affecting stock returns. 
These outcomes provide some useful implications 
for implementing optimal economic policy. In particular, 
considering the importance of an unyielding institu- 
tional fight against any intricate forms of corruption that 
affect economic activity, the relation between intercon- 
nection and trade openness has to be more properly 
declined according to various countries’ different insti- 





actions able to improve productivity must be promoted 
thoroughly. 
A future agenda of research may develop an analysis 
of new control variables (e.g., political stability and single 
countries’ legal origin), by extending the methodology to 















































































































1. All the companies of the sample are featured by a 
statutory prevision of “one share–one vote” (Harris & 
Raviv, 1988). 
2. The literature gives several solutions for computing 
a corporate pro- ductivity index, preferring the ratio 
between annual revenues and the number of firm 
employees (see, for example, Freeman, 2008). 
However, due to the lack of data, we prefer a 
productivity index computed as the ratio between 
revenues and total assets. 
3. In order to overcome the issue of an overall limited 
explained vari- ance, the established asset pricing 
financial literature (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972; 
Fama & Macbeth, 1973) generally assembles large 
sample of companies into different portfolios 
according either market capital- ization or β 
coefficients in order to increase the power of the 
explained variances of the different specifications. 
4. The role of macroeconomic indicators in affecting 
stock returns is also addressed in recent literature on 
performances of industrial com- panies (e.g., El 
Khoury, 2015). 
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